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THE INTERNALIST JUSTIFICATORY FUNCTION
OF REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM2
Abstract. In the present essay it is discussed the main features of reductio ad absurdum as a
source of justification. These properties are consequences of the employment of contradictions
as a reason for proving if a statement is true. Although a valid deductive argument can build
an internalistic justification, I would suggest that the justification obtained by reductio ad
absurdum cannot be externalist. This is because contradictions as reasons can be considered
internal states from different definitions.
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Although it could be obvious that any deductive argument and method can confer in-
ternalist justification, the main point of the present essay is to argue that demonstration
through Reductio ad Absurdum (RA) is sufficient condition to obtain an internalistic
justification. The latter is because RA requires the mental construction of impossible
entities and, in some sense, being introduced to an absurd world. These requirements
are not only high intellectual achievements, but they also depend in a strong way on
the mental states, perspective and available items of the thinker that develops the
demonstration. For that dependency, I would suggest that the use of contradiction as
a justifier (with the steps involved in its employment) is sufficient to consider the re-
sulting justification there as internalistic from many of the main kinds of contemporary
internalism, namely mentalism, perspectival internalism and accesibilism.
1. Contradiction as a Source of Demonstration
The RA or proof by contradiction is an indirect method of demonstration that has two
main applications: as a tool of research and as a means of exposition (Polya 1973).
It is an indirect method because the statement to be proved (𝑞) is inferred from an
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absurd or contradiction rather than from certain premise (𝑝)3. In this way, proof by
contraposition can be considered as another indirect method, because there, the major
proposition is demonstrated through the true value of the equivalent contrapositive
statement (¬𝑞 → ¬𝑝). In classical mathematical logic, RA can be presented as a
tautological axiom, (𝐴 → 𝐵) → ((𝐴 → ¬𝐵) → ¬𝐴)4; and as derived rule (Epstein,
2011):
(¬𝐴 → 𝐵) ∧ (¬𝐴 → ¬𝐵)
∴𝐴
In this inferential structure 𝐴 represents the statement that has to be demonstrated,
the two premises—(¬𝐴 → 𝐵), (¬𝐴 → ¬𝐵)—deduce a contradiction from the denial
of 𝐴; 𝐴 and 𝐵 are metalinguistic variables that can denote any well-formed formulas,
including conditionals. In the next example (Hine 2019), the conclusion A is “the
difference of any rational number and any irrational number is irrational’’; and the
contradiction is that certain number 𝑦 is rational and irrational.
1. The difference of some rational number 𝑥 and some irrational number 𝑦 is rational.
2. The number 𝑥 is equivalent to a certain fraction (𝑎/𝑏) among two integers 𝑎 and 𝑏,
𝑎/𝑏.
3. 𝑥 less 𝑦 is equal to a certain fraction (𝑐/𝑑) between two integers 𝑐 and 𝑑, 𝑐/𝑑.
4. 𝑦 is equivalent to the difference of the fractions (𝑎/𝑏) and (𝑐/𝑑).
5. The difference of the fractions (𝑎/𝑏) and (𝑐/𝑑) is a certain fraction (𝑒/𝑓) among two
integers 𝑒 and 𝑓 .
6. 𝑦 is a rational number that is equivalent to 𝑒/𝑓 .
∴ 7. The difference of any rational number and any irrational number is irrational.
2. Construction and Destruction of Impossible Entities
Polya (1973) offers an account of RA as an open-minded procedure, which explains the
difficulties involved in it as an intellectual achievement. According to Polya, RA not
only states the truth of a statement, but it also shows why it is true. This is because
RA must be employed when some trials to make consistent certain proposition have
failed; the involved contradiction explains why the opposite statement is true.
RA demands a high intellectual effort because it is easier retaining in mind truths
than falsehoods. RA urges us to create something impossible and clearly remembering
the elements of the resulting contradictory entities (such as the final prime number,
the fraction equivalent to
√
2, and others); if those points are not kept through the
proof, the RA fails. RA is not an obvious procedure because it is hard maintaining not
3Following the convention, “𝑝” and “𝑞” represent propositional variables.
4“𝐴” and “𝐵” are used as metalinguistic variables that mean well-formed formulas.
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only something that is not true, but even the elements that compose a falsehood. This
intellectual effort can arise frustration (Leron 1985), the feeling that what had been
created through the demonstration was vainly retained. This is because RA requests,
unlike other sorts of demonstration, not only the mental construction of an impossible
entity, but even destroying this artificial picture.
Another major obstacle with proof by contradiction consists in identifying where
the absurd can be found. The contradiction might directly appear with one of the
original premises or may result with inferred propositions during the demonstration
(Jourdan, Yevdokimov 2016). But in addition, the absurd can be found with a well-
known falsehood that is not explicitly a contradiction (i.e. 1 = 0). This is the situation
with the following proof by RA of “If 𝑎 × 𝑏 = 0, then 𝑎 = 0 or 𝑏 = 0’’, where 𝑎 and 𝑏
are real numbers (Antonino, Mariotti 2006).
1. The product of two integers 𝑎 and 𝑏 is equivalent to zero, but neither 𝑎, nor 𝑏 is
equivalent to zero.
2. The fraction 1/𝑎 is the multiplicative inverse5 of 𝑎.
3. The fraction 1/𝑏 is the multiplicative inverse of 𝑏.
4. 𝑎 × 𝑏 multiplied by 1/𝑎 is equivalent to zero mulplied by 1/𝑎.
5. 𝑎 × 𝑏 multiplied by 1/𝑎 is equal to 𝑏 × 1.
6. 𝑏 multiplied by 1/𝑏 is equivalent to zero mulplied by 1/𝑏.
7. 𝑏 multiplied by 1/𝑏 is equal to 1.
8. 1 is equivalent to zero.
∴ 9. The difference of any rational number and any irrational number is irrational.
For the latter, there are at least three intellectual achievements that makes RA a
complex method:
1. Remembering not only a falsehood, but even its components and consequences.
2. Mentally constructing and destroying an impossible entity.
3. Finding an absurd not only through the premises and their implications, but even
with falsehoods that are known to be false beyond the demonstration.
3. RA and an Internalistic Justification
The main internalist thesis is that the justificatory status of any statement for a person
supervenes on conditions that are internal to the person (Fumerton 2007). From a
broad point of view, there are at least three general groups of internalist conception
as distinct definitions of what is internal, namely mentalism, perspectival internalism
and accesibilism.
When mentalism (Conee, Feldman 2004) defends that the justificatory status of a
proposition depends on internal states, it is referring to the thinker’s mental states.
5The product of the multiplicative inverse of the number 𝑎 and 𝑎 is equal to 1.
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This conception is not restricted to discursive justification, mental states include not
only justified beliefs or knowledge, but even sensations, thoughts, and dispositional
states. As it has been mentioned, RA demands the intellectual construction of a
strictly impossible entity or circumstance. If what is elaborated during a RA were not
impossible it would not demonstrate anything. Can these absurd entities be located out
of the mental field? I would suggest that this cannot be done without severe difficulties.
It is evident that in the empirical and physical world there are not contradictory objects
or affairs, because if they were impossible, they could not physically exist. But even
accepting something as mind-independent abstract entities it is at least dubious that
they could be plenty contradictory. Thus, since the justifier (something with a justifying
role) in a RA cannot exist out of the thinker’s mind, any advocate of mentalism must
consider this sort of demonstration as an internalistic justification.
Perspectival internalism takes the internal grounds that justify a proposition as the
justified beliefs that are inside the subjective conception of certain epistemic agent (Al-
ston 1986). In this sense, perspectival internalism is limited to justification by reasons
from the subject’s perspective. In a proof by contradiction its extension and steps are
not fully determined for the proper main proposition to be proved. This explains why
the same statement can be established using distinct contradictions. Where the absurd
must be found is an inquiry in which the beliefs of the thinker display a fundamental
role, because the contradiction can be discovered through different ways. If the justifi-
cation obtained by contradiction is conditioned for what the subject justifiably believes,
then it can be considered as internalistic from this second conception of internalism.
It is always possible that the RA could not be successful because the thinker has not
had enough of his/her beliefs in consideration; a subject without any beliefs related to
the main statement to be demonstrated cannot prove anything by contradiction.
The third kind of internalism mentioned, accesibilism or access internalism, identi-
fies the internal conditions with justifiers to which a subject has certain special access.
Chisholm (1966) assumes as internal the justificatory conditions that are accessible
merely by reflecting upon his own conscious states without any other short of support,
as direct awareness, or acquaintance (Fumerton 2007). The clearest obstacle to con-
sider the grounds obtained through proof by contradiction as directly accessible arises
when this access is understood as a non-inferential one. This is because in any RA the
absurd seems to be the result of many inferences involved in its steps; in appearance
the contradiction is not directly accessible. However, it can be argued that contradic-
tion cannot be partially grasped, because it only results when its elements are taken
together, if they are separated, for example in different moments, the contradiction dis-
appears; thus, what could be taken as inferentially obtained is the components of the
contradiction. The absurd in a RA when is reached is taken as a whole, the recognition
of the proper contradiction is directly made without inferences behind.
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4. Conclusion
By the precedent discussion, the employment of a contradiction as a method of proof im-
plies several consequences that are not shared with other deductive procedures. These
non-shared features allow the asserting that the construction of a RA is enough to
obtain an internalistic justification, because an absurd can be considered an internal
element in three main ways. Since contradictions neither can be physical objects or
circumstances, nor can they be abstract mind-independent entities, them must be re-
garded as mental pictures. In addition, the discovery of a contradiction depends on
the beliefs that compose the thinker’s perspective. This is because in RA there is not
a unique contradiction that could be located. Finally, when something is taken as an
absurd in a demonstration, this is grasped as a whole; by the latter there is only one
intellectual act in the recognition of something as a contradiction. Being aware of an
absurd is not inferential in nature.
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